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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the unassailable rudiments of contract law is that the
written manifestation of assent is not the contract but merely
constitutes evidence thereof.' The scope of the "contract" may or
may not be coextensive with the documentation evidencing it.
2
The writing may be frugal; it may require explanation or
supplementation. 3 Or the writing may appear to be exhaustive
and may even contain an expression that it is the final, complete,
and exclusive manifestation of the parties' assent.4 Regardless of
the sparsity or elaborateness of the writing, the rudiment pre-
vails: the writing is only evidence of the contract.
The scope of the contractual obligation-the "circle of
assent"--may be gleaned from sources other than the writing.5 If
the writing is incomplete, the gaps are filled judicially with
reasonable times, reasonable performance terms, and even
reasonable prices.6 The disease of indefiniteness will now be fatal
only in the extreme case in which two elements are not present:
the parties' intention to be bound and a reasonably certain basis
for affording a remedy. 7 The augmentation of judicial gap-
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, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Introductory Note §§ 235-44, at 533 (Tent.
Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]; J. MURRAY, CON-
TRACTS § 2, at 5 (1974) [hereinafter cited as MURRAY].
2 See 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 588 (1960) [hereinafter cited as CORBIN]; 4 S.
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 636 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1961) [hereinafter cited as WILLISTON].
' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 240; 3 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 579; 4
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4 See 3 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 578; 4 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 633.
5 See 3 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 579; 4 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 632.
6 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 230; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§
2-309, -311, -305.
7RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 21B; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
2-204(3).
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filling capacity dictated by article two of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code and supported by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts is
an extrapolation of a process clearly discoverable in pre-Code
contract law and is, therefore, neither radical nor remarkable. 8 It
is a substantial recognition that parties do not always or even
usually express themselves comprehensively when entering a
final agreement.
Where the documentation evidencing the agreement is
elaborate and perhaps even states that it is comprehensive and
exclusive-the sole manifestation of the agreement-some provi-
sions appearing in article two and incorporated in the Restatement
(Second), though rooted in pre-Code contract law, are expressed
without the covert devices of earlier law. The contract appar-
ently evidenced by the complete, final, and exclusive manifesta-
tion of assent found in the writing containing, for example, the
negotiated merger clause, was always subject to defenses of
fraud, duress, or some form of mistake.9 Today it is also subject
to the defense that one of the parties was unaware of a material
risk-shifting provision inconspicuously inserted in the writing or,
if aware, had no genuine choice in assenting to it.i ° Because real
or genuine assent was absent, a court may be called upon to
excise the provision as unconscionable." Beyond these basic de-
fenses, the writing may not state the true intention of the parties.
If sufficient proof is introduced that the scrivener has erred, the
writing will be reformed to state the true intention.' 2 If the writ-
ing states the true intention and the agreement is otherwise free
8 Cf. Magnolia Warehouse & Storage Co. v. Davis & Blackwell, 108 Tex. 422, 424,
195 S.W. 184, 185 (1917):
The general rule is that parol testimony cannot be received to contradict,
vary, add to, or subtract from the terms of a valid written contract. But one of
the exceptions to the general rule is that if the written instrument itself shows to
be either ambiguous or incomplete, parol testimony is admissible to show what
the real contract was to the extent necessary to remove the ambiguity, and to
make the contract complete in its terms which show to be incomplete.
See also Morgan v. Steinberg, 23 S.W.2d 527, 533 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930): "The parol
evidence rule does not exclude testimony necessary to make a writing effective which on
its face is clearly incomplete .... "
9 
See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 237 (1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note
1, § 240; 3 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 580; 4 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 634.
10 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-202, -207, -302. See also RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND), supra note 1, § 237; Murray, Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. PiTT. L.
REV. 1 (1969).
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 234.
12 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 504 (1932); 3 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 614; 4
WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 631.
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from the defects already mentioned, the writing is still subject to
interpretation, and evidence of the meaning of the terms
-evidence of the idea beneath the language skin-may be ad-
mitted to assist the courts in framing the true "circle of assent."'
3
(This process will occur in all jurisdictions except those that still
cling to the archaic absurdity that the language has only one true
and plain meaning.14) Interpretation will not address itself solely
to the ordinary meaning of the terms; trade usage, prior course
of dealing, and any evidence of partial performance under the
contract will strongly indicate the meaning the parties intended
by the terms of their writing.'5 Even private codes or conven-
tions between the parties may be introduced to indicate, for ex-
ample, that "horse" in the writing really means "cow.'
' 6
The parties may attempt to state their agreement in clear
and unambiguous words; but try as they may they will fail, for
scarcely any word is capable of denoting only one thought. They
may attempt to account for all contingencies, but the unforeseen
may still occur. The attempt is doomed because mortals lack
omniscience and presentiation is, therefore, limited.' 7 They may
even attempt to place complete finality in their agreement by
expressing that intention in their writing; but no matter, they
cannot agree not to agree just as they are incapable of agreeing
to agree. They can place safeguards on subsequent modifications
by requiring any such modifications to be evidenced by another
writing;' 8 but even this private statute of frauds is subject to
waiver that becomes irrevocable through reliance.' 9
The permanent record of the agreement is created to assure
certainty, stability, and predictability-to provide security to the
13 See Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 423 (1918) (Holmes, J.): "A word is not a
crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly
in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used."
,1 For recent statements of this "principle," see Kreis v. Venture Out in America,
Inc., 375 F. Supp. 482 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); C & A Constr. Co., Inc. v. Benning Constr.
Co., 509 S.W.2d 302 (Ark. 1974); Fort Wayne Bank Bldg., Inc. v. Bank Bldg. & Equip.
Corp., 309 N.E.2d 464 (Ind. App. 1974).
5 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-202(a).
16 See MURRAY, supra note 1, § 109; 3 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 539.
" See Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentiation, 60 VA. L. REV. 589
(1974). See also Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 17 S. CAL L. REV. 691 (1974).
'8 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-209(2).
,' Id. §§ 2-209(4)-(5). See, e.g., Wagner v. Graziano Constr. Co., 390 Pa. 445, 448, 136
A.2d 82, 83 (1957) (Musmanno, J.): "The most ironclad written contract can always be
cut into by the acetylene torch of parol modification supported by adequate proof." See
also Knight v. Gulf Ref. Co., 311 Pa. 357, 360, 166 A. 880, 882 (1933).
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parties and to avoid the possibility of even innocent favorable
recollection. 20 Yet there is no writing sufficient to avoid the
largely unforeseen possibilities just explored. It should, however,
be possible to avoid uncertainty as to matters that are not only
knowable but have been discussed prior to the execution of the
final writing. As a prelude to a final agreement, any number of
possibilities may have been discussed and some manifestations of
tentative agreement may have occurred. Yet when the moment
of final agreement arrives, evidenced by a writing that the par-
ties intend to be the exclusive manifestation of their agreement,
should they not at least be entitled to the assurance that prior
discussions and even prior tentative agreements are discharged
through the execution of the final, completely "integrated" writ-
ing? Certainly, if that is their intention and if they are mutually
aware that the writing is the sole repository of their manifested
intention, the writing should be afforded that special protection
at least over prior extrinsic agreements.
Both the Code and the Restatement (Second) attempt to pro-
tect this interest in the security of agreements. The Restatement
(Second) provides that "[a] binding integrated agreement dis-
charges prior agreements to the extent that it is inconsistent with
them"21 and that "[a] binding completely integrated agreement
discharges prior agreements to the extent that they are within its
scope. '22 Even after an integrated agreement has been proved
and the prior agreement is shown to be inconsistent therewith,
one can still escape the provisions of the writing by raising de-
fenses of fraud, duress, mistake, and unconscionability. 23 This
Article will evaluate the effect given a writing by the Restatement
(Second), beginning with an examination of its treatment of the
parol evidence rule, followed by a critique of its application of
the rule and of the doctrine of unconscionability to an increas-
20See E.A. Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. Broderick, 522 P.2d 144, 145-46
(Utah 1974):
To permit [the introduction of oral testimony] would be to cast doubt upon all
the integrity of contracts and to leave a party to a solemn agreement at the
mercy of the uncertainties of oral testimony given by one who in the subsequent
light of events discovers that he made a bad bargain.
See also McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device for Control of the Jury, 41
YALE L.J. 365, 368 (1932) (exploring the possibility of "recollection warped by self-
interest").
21 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 239(1).
22 Id. § 239(2).
23 See text accompanying notes 9-11 supra.
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ingly important type of contract-the standardized form con-
tract.
II. THE PAROL EVIDENCE PROCESS
IN THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
A. Origins of the Parol Evidence Rule
It can be argued that the parties' legitimate interest in the
security of their agreement is adequately protected by another
rudiment of contract law: parties may agree today to rescind or
modify their agreement of yesterday.24 In other words, they may
agree today to treat any prior agreements as nullities, and their
intention should be effected. But one of the parties typically
argues that the writing was not intended to nullify a particular
prior agreement. He seeks to introduce evidence that such a
prior agreement was made and that the parties intended it to
coexist with the agreement manifested in the writing.25 Why not
permit such evidence to be considered by the trier of fact? The
question scarcely survives the asking. Will the trier of fact accord
the writing-the permanent record of the agreement that the
parties carefully framed-the preference it deserves, or will the
final, written evidence of agreement be commingled with evi-
dence of all prior discussions from which a contract may be
created by the trier of fact? Certainly it can be argued that juries
must not be permitted such leeway because they are not suffi-
ciently sophisticated to accord the written evidence its sacred
place. Simply put, juries may not be trusted with such a task,
regardless of awesome instructions from the court,26 but must be
shielded from evidence of any prior agreements if the parties
indeed intended the writing to be the final and complete man-
ifestation of their agreement. The security and stability of trans-
actions demand this protection. On the other hand, juries must
not be told that they cannot be trusted with this task or with a
determination of whether the parties intended their writing to
be final and complete (admittedly a question of fact) because that
determination requires that evidence of the alleged prior extrin-
sic matter be considered and compared with the writing. Pre-
sumably no writing is sufficient to exclude evidence of every
24 3 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 574.
2
5 See, e.g., Mitchill v. Lath, 247 N.Y. 377, 160 N.E. 646 (1928).
26 See McCormick, supra note 20.
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alleged extrinsic agreement. 27 Thus a question of intention-a
question of fact-must be kept from the jury. That question of
intention must be reserved for the court and may even be
characterized as that which it is not-that is, a question of law-
-to insure that the court will decide it.
28
Because the goal has been defined as precluding the jury
from even hearing the evidence of the prior agreement, the
court's ultimate finding that the writing is final and complete is
properly characterized as an evidentiary process. Typically the
evidence of the prior extrinsic matter sought to be introduced
will be evidence of a parol (which often means "oral") agree-
ment. Thus the process by which the court decides whether to
permit the trier of fact to hear evidence of the prior extrinsic
agreement may be called the application of the parol evidence
rule. Under such a caption the process may appear to be just
another judicial evidentiary ruling, and the unpleasantness of
informing juries of their incapacity to deal with a question of
intention may be avoided. 29
Other difficulties remain. How will the court itself deter-
mine whether the parties intended their writing to be complete
and final-that is, totally integrated-thereby evidencing their
intention that any alleged prior agreement was to be nullified?
Shall the court first determine whether the prior agreement was
in fact made? This is a matter of intention-clearly a question of
fact. That the parties made such an agreement prior to their
writing does not mean they intended it to survive execution of
the writing. Moreover, if the court is convinced that the parties
did make the prior agreement, then even the court may not
accord the final writing the preference it deserves. 30 Therefore,
the test for integration must be different: if parties situated as
were these would naturally and normally include the matter of
27 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 236, comment b.
28 For a recent example, see Storybook Homes, Inc. v. Carlson, 19 Ill. App.3d 579,
312 N.E.2d 27 (1974).
29 See McCormick, supra note 20, at 369:
"Parol evidence is inadmissible to vary, contradict, or add to the terms of a
written instrument." The phrase becomes a shibboleth, repeated in ten thousand
cases. It obviously enables the judge to head off the difficulty at its source, not
by professing to decide any question as to the credibility of the asserted oral
variation, but by professing to exclude the evidence from the jury altogether
because forbidden by a mysterious legal ban.
:0 Cf. Geiger v. Hansen, 214 Kan. 83, 519 P.2d 699 (1974) (admitting evidence of the
prior agreement, which the court believed was made, under the guise of a condition).
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their extrinsic agreement in the writing subsequently executed,
the extrinsic matter will be regarded as a nullity because that is
their presumable intention.31 This presumable intention may be
fictitious but it is necessary in order to maintain the sanctity of
the writing. If the extrinsic matter may naturally and normally
coexist with the writing subsequently executed, evidence of such
extrinsic matter may be laid before the trier of fact, who may
then decide whether the evidence is sufficient to support a find-
ing that such an agreement was made. Another guide (rather
than test) is suggested: was the extrinsic matter mentioned or
dealt with at all in the writing? If it was mentioned in the writing,
then presumably the parties have expressed all of their intention
as to that matter in the writing and do not intend to be bound by
any prior agreement with respect to that matter. If the matter is
not mentioned or dealt with at all in the writing, then presuma-
bly the parties did not intend their writing to nullify any such
prior agreement.
32
Some commentators strongly urge a test that would em-
phasize the actual intention of the parties. They would eschew
any evidentiary gloss and have the court focus upon two ques-
tions: Was the extrinsic agreement made? Did the parties intend
to nullify that agreement by their subsequent writing?33 This
merely restates the principle mentioned above: Did the parties
agree today to nullify their agreement of yesterday? The applica-
tion of this test requires no "parol evidence rule." It emphasizes
the actual intention of the parties rather than the fictitious prob-
lem of whether parties might naturally and normally include the
alleged extrinsic matter in the writing.
The chief proponent of the actual intention test was Profes-
sor Corbin.34 It is generally agreed that the Corbin view emascu-
lates the parol evidence rule.35 The chief proponent of the fic-
titious intention test, Professor Williston, was extremely anxious
to protect the integrity of the writing over inferior, antecedent
expressions of agreement. 36 Because both giants of contract law
described the critical question to be decided by the court as one
31 See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-202, Comment 3; 4 WILLISTON, supra
note 2, § 633.
32 See 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 638 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
33 3 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 582.
34 Id.
3- 47 ALl PROCEEDINGS 476 (1970).
36 4 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 638.
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of the intention of the parties, a discussion of their complete
disagreement as to how this process is to be made operative has
often been avoided. Many desirable and highly readable analyses
of the parol evidence rule attempt to clarify the process by, inter
alia, distinguishing it from questions of mistake, fraud, duress,
unconscionability, reformation, interpretation, and even condi-
tions precedent to contract formation. 37 Less attention has been
paid to the process of the trial court's determination of integra-
tion. The term "integration" itself is a conclusory label with the
appearance of considerable analytical meaning, but it can be ap-
plied only after the analysis is complete. With rare exceptions,
however, judicial grappling with parol evidence questions
demonstrates considerable myopia.38 A typical judicial effort in-
volves no more than application of conclusory labels-for exam-
ple, that the extrinsic matter is "collateral" to the agreement
manifested by the writing-without the analysis necessary to a
proper determination of integration.
39
With the appearance and now almost universal enactment of
article two of the Uniform Commercial Code, with its total rejec-
tion of a property orientation for sale-of-goods contracts 40 and
its almost iconoclastic emphasis on "agreements in fact" and
consequent de-emphasis of the written manifestation of agree-
ment (particularly printed forms),4' one might have expected
that a major restatement of the parol evidence rule would be
included. For critics of the rule, the Code restatement is a
disappointment. 42 The hopes of the critics were again raised
with the appearance of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which
largely incorporates the substantial modifications of traditional
3' See, e.g., Calamari & Perillo, A Plea for a Uniform Parol Evidence Rule and Principles
of Contract Interpretation, 42 IND. L. REV. 333 (1967); Sweet, Contract Making and Parol
Evidence: Diagnosis and Treatment of a Sick Rule, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 1036 (1968).
18 For one of the rare exceptions, see the majority opinion in Masterson v. Sine, 68
Cal.2d 222, 436 P.2d 561, 65 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1968).
" See, e.g., Pasquale Food Co. v. L & H Int'l Airmotive, Inc., 51 Ala. App. 127, 134,
283 So. 2d 438, 444 (1973):
The comparison is made with certain established tests applied to the oral agree-
ment: (1) Is it in form a collateral one? (2) It must not contradict express or
implied provisions of the written contract. (3) It must be one that parties would
not ordinarily be expected to embody in the writing.
Cf. Intermar, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 364 F. Supp. 82, 98 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Jannes v.
Microwave Communications, Inc., 16 Ill. App.3d 582, 588, 306 N.E.2d 473, 478 (1973);
Young v. Gardner, 507 S.W.2d 250, 261-62 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
40 UNIFORMI. COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-401, Preamble; id. § 2-509, Comment I.
", See id. §§ 1-201(3), 2-207.
42 Cf id. § 2-202.
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contract doctrine found in article two of the Code and often
extrapolates Code changes in the American realist tradition. 43
Moreover, the Restatement (Second) is clearly influenced by the
criticisms of Professor Corbin, whose extensive notes-though
still secreted in the possession of the Chief Reporter-were
available to the draftsmen of the Restatement (Second).44
Whether the hopes of the rule's critics were dashed again is
one of the subjects of this Article. If the Restatement (Second)
manages to set forth a statement of the rule and its appendages
that courts can adopt and apply, the confusion and contradiction
evidenced by judicial attempts to apply some kind of parol evi-
dence rule may be remedied. The original Restatement of Contracts
and, presumably, the Restatement (Second), are presented as au-
thoritative expositions of the subject; but an authoritative exposi-
tion of the cluster of concepts labeled the "parol evidence rule" is
no easy task. It is important to determine whether that task has
been accomplished.
B. The "Preliminary" Determination
If one searches the Restatement (Second) to discover the section
dealing with the parol evidence rule, it may appear to be section
239, captioned parenthetically "Parol Evidence Rule." Yet the
title of section 239, to which the parenthetical was belatedly
added, is "Effect of Integrated Agreement on Prior Agree-
ments." Thus the Restatement (Second) describes the parol evi-
dence rule in terms of "effect." It might also be described as an
inevitable conclusion; and, like other conclusory statements, its
analytical value is suspect. In particular, subsections (1) and (2)
of section 239 contain all of the qualities of a truism:
(1) A binding integrated agreement discharges prior ag-
reements to the extent that it is inconsistent with them.
(2) A binding completely integrated agreement discharges
prior agreements to the extent that they are within its
scope.
45
Comment b, entitled "Inconsistent terms," begins to suggest
the critical question: "Whether a binding agreement is com-
pletely integrated or partially integrated, it supersedes inconsis-
41See Murray, The Realism of Behaviorism Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 51 ORE.
L. REV. 269 (1972).
44 48 ALl PROCEEDINGS 442 (1971).
45 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 239.
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tent terms of prior agreements. To apply this rule, the court
must make preliminary determinations that there is an inte-
grated agreement and that it is inconsistent with the term in
question.
46
The "preliminary determinations" of "integration" are the
subject of sections 235 and 236, the first two sections of topic
three, "Effect of Adoption of a Writing." Section 235 identifies
an "Integrated Agreement" as one or more writings "constitut-
ing a final expression of one or more terms of an agreement"
47
and states that the question of integration is a question for the
court "preliminary to determination of a question of interpreta-
tion or to application of the parol evidence rule. 48 Section 236,
"Partially Integrated Agreements," distinguishes completely in-
tegrated from partially integrated agreements49 and likewise in-
dicates that the question of either complete or partial integration
is one for the court "as a question preliminary to determination
of a question of interpretation or to application of the parol
evidence rule. '50 Section 239 states the effects of the determina-
tion that the "agreement" is integrated. 51 Section 240 lists some
well known exceptions to the rule that an integrated agreement
supersedes prior statements. 52 Section 241 indicates that evi-
dence may not be admitted to contradict the terms of an inte-
grated writing whether the writing is partially or completely
integrated.5 3 With unassailable logic, section 242 states that the
evidence of consistent additional terms is inadmissible if the writ-
ing is deemed by the court to be completely integrated. 54 Subsec-
tion (2) of section 242 proceeds to suggest two tests for complete
integration not found in section 236.
The critical question-arguably the exclusive question-
involved in the parol evidence process is the question of inte-
gration. It is a "preliminary" question only in the sense that it
must be answered in the negative by the court before the addi-
tional terms may be considered by the jury. It is, however, the
only question that the court must consider. The essence of the
46 Id. § 239, comment b (emphasis supplied).
4 7 Id. § 235(1).
48 Id. § 235(2).
49 Id. §§ 236(l)-(2).
50 Id. § 236(3).
51 Id. § 239.
52 Id. § 240.
53 Id. § 241.
54 Id. § 242.
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parol evidence process is found in the determination of the par-
ties' intention that their writing be the final expression of their
agreement. The further determination that the parties intended
their writing to be complete as well as final renders their writing
not only integrated but "completely integrated. ' 55 If a writing is
completely integrated, the intention of the parties has been de-
termined to be that the writing is the complete, final, and exclu-
sive manifestation of their agreement. The negative implication
is obvious: no prior agreement relating to matters within the
scope of their contract was intended by the parties to be binding,
even if such a prior agreement is consistent with the terms of
their exclusive statement. Having decided that the parties in-
tended their writing to be the exclusive statement of their
mutual undertakings, a court will protect that intention by refus-
ing to enforce prior agreements. 56 Thus the parol evidence
"rule"-or, preferably, the parol evidence "process"-is itself the
determination of integration by the court. It is not the prelimi-
nary question; it is the only question. From this perspective, the
parenthetical phrase "Parol Evidence Rule" might more properly
have been added to the sections on integration, sections 235 and
236.
The foregoing should not be dismissed as a matter of
semantics. A curious myopia has prevailed among lawyers and
judges as to the process called the parol evidence rule. Unfortu-
nately, the Restatement (Second) may not only fail to remedy, but
may actually help to perpetuate that defect. The American Law
Institute Proceedings contain only a perfunctory discussion of
the critical question of integration in sections 235 and 236,
though the Chief Reporter was obviously willing to entertain
greater discussion of the matter. 57 Section 237, dealing with
standardized agreements, had been extensively explored in con-
nection with the new section on unconscionability, section 234;
and after the brief mention of sections 235 and 236, the mem-
bers went on to section 238, "Interpretation of Integrated
Agreements." This discussion consumed the rest of the time de-
55 Id. § 236.
5' See, e.g., La Puzza v. Prom Town House Motor Inn, Inc., 191 Neb. 687, 691, 217
N.W.2d 472, 476 (1974) ("Any such agreement should have been included in the terms
of the contract if it was to be effective. Defendant is now seeking to reform the contract
by parol evidence, asserting an agreement which allegedly was made before the contract
was signed."); accord, Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 607 (Utah 1974).
57 47 ALI PROCEEDINGS 536-37 (1970).
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voted to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts in the 1970 Proceed-
ings. With only two minutes remaining, the Director said, "I
think it would be foolhardy to believe that the Reporter could
dispose of the parol evidence rule in two minutes . .," thus
indicating that the questions discussed to that point, including
the questions of integrated agreements, were regarded as sepa-
rate from, and preliminary to, the parol evidence rule.58
With the exception of section 238, however, all the sections
of topic three are certainly related to the parol evidence rule. By
identifying the rule as "primarily" stated in section 239, em-
phasis is placed upon the effect of the rule or, again, the neces-
sary conclusion from a finding of integration, rather than upon
the critical question of how a court decides whether the parties
intended their writing to be a final, or a final and complete,
expression of their agreement. This bifurcation of a single pro-
cess allows a court to attach a conclusory label-"integrated" or
"completely integrated"-to a particular contract and then to
"apply" the parol evidence "rule" to exclude evidence of prior
statements without focusing on the fundamental question of
whether the evidence should be admitted. By perpetuating this
confusion, the Restatement (Second) largely negates the beneficial
effects of its adopting Corbin's more realistic view of the parol
evidence process.
C. Integrated Agreements and Integrated Writings
The definitions in sections 235 and 236 cause some concern
because of their possible confusion of the agreement with the
writing. Any written expression of the agreement-whether it is
not final, final, or final and complete-is nothing more than the
manifestation of the agreement. It is not the agreement.59 If the
expression of agreement is determined to be final and complete,
the terms of the agreement will be regarded as only those terms
set forth in the writing. Two forms of intention must be distin-
guished if any attempt to understand the parol evidence process
is to be successful. In order to have any binding agreement, the
parties must intend to be bound to certain obligations they have
58 Id. 544. In his opening remarks in 1971, the Reporter, in discussing a suggestion
that the caption for the whole of topic three should include a reference to the parol
evidence rule, claimed that "the parol evidence rule is primarily stated in section 239
.... " 48 id. 445 (1971).
-5 See text accompanying note 1 supra.
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voluntarily undertaken. 60 This intention, tested through its out-
ward manifestations because a subjective test is unworkable, 61 is
a sine qua non of an enforceable agreement. The parol evidence
process, on the other hand, is concerned with a different inten-
tion, the intention to be bound exclusively to those undertakings
evidenced by a writing or writings. The sine qua non for the
invocation of the parol evidence process is that the parties have
expressed their agreement in the form of a writing. The focus
then shifts to whether they intended that writing to be their final
expression of agreement, their complete expression of agree-
ment, or only some incomplete expression thereof.
The confusion between the agreement and the writing is
found throughout the Restatement (Second) sections that bear
upon the parol evidence process. After defining "integrated
agreement" as a writing or writings constituting a final expression
of one or more terms of the agreement and a "completely in-
tegrated agreement" as a complete and exclusive statement of the
terms of the agreement, section 239 indicates that "[a] binding
integrated agreement discharges prior agreements to the extent
that it is inconsistent with them. '6 2 Is "it" the agreement or the
writing evidencing the agreement?63 Because "integrated agree-
ment" is defined in section 235 as "a writing or writings con-
stituting a final expression," it may be inferred that "it" refers to
the writing. However, this plausible analysis is overcome by sec-
tion 241, concerning contradiction of integrated terms: "Except
as stated in the preceding section [exceptions to the parol evi-
dence rule], where there is a binding agreement, either com-
pletely or partially integrated, evidence of prior or contem-
poraneous agreements or negotiations is not admissible in evi-
dence to contradict a term of the writing.
'64
Why is "writing" used in section 241 rather than "integrated
agreement," which, after all, is defined as "a writing or writings
constituting a final expression"?65 Some assistance may be de-
rived from comment a to section 241, which indicates that the
rule of section 241 is simply "an evidentiary consequence of
§ 239." Although this is less than completely satisfactory, it might
60 See text accompanying note 7 supra.
" See MURRAY, supra note 1, § 19.
62 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), supra note 1, § 239(1) (emphasis supplied).
63 Cf. id. § 239.
64 Id. § 241 (emphasis supplied).
65 Id. § 235.
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be plausible to view section 239 as stating the substantive effect
of the parol evidence rule-that is, the discharge of prior
agreements-while section 241, which deals with the inadmissi-
bility of evidence to contradict a term of the writing, is viewed as
a procedural consequence of the determination that the agree-
ment is integrated. Even this reading is doomed, however, when
section 242, concerning consistent additional terms, is con-
sidered. Like section 241, it merely "states an evidentiary conse-
quence of § 239."66 Section 242(1) provides, "[e]vidence of a
consistent additional term is admissible to supplement an integ-
rated agreement unless the court finds that the agreement was
completely integrated." A reasonable paraphrase of this subsec-
tion might be: evidence of consistent additional (prior?) terms is
inadmissible to supplement the terms of a completely integrated
agreement. Why not "writing," as in section 241, rather than
''agreement"?
It should be emphasized that the Reporter seemed less than
enamored of the continued use of "integrated" in any form
67
and at one point suggested, "I think there is a certain sorrow
about the phrase 'integrated agreement' and if you had a better
word, it could well be an improvement. '68 No "better word"
emerged from the discussions, so the phrase remained; unfortu-
nately, it is not sufficiently distinguished from the more cogent if
still conclusory phrase, "integrated writing."
The language and structure of these sections reveal little
awareness of the supreme importance of the underlying ques-
tion: did the parties intend their writing to be a final or final and
complete expression of their agreement? The corollary question
of how the court, to which the matter has been left by the Re-
statement (Second),69 decides whether the parties intended their
writing to be a final or final and complete expression of their
agreement is, therefore, equally underemphasized. The discov-
erable terms are usually found in the comments, which contain
parts of the Corbin, Williston, and Wigmore tests,70 some slight
mention of the "appearance" test,71 and a provision concerning
66 Id. § 242, comment a.
67 48 ALI PROCEEDINGS 444-46 (1971).
68 Id. 446.
69 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 239, comment b.
70 See generally 3 CORBIN, supra note 2, §§ 573-96; 9 WIGMORE, supra note 32, §§
2429-49; 4 WILUSTON, supra note 2, §§ 631-47.
71 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 236, comment b.
1975]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:1342
consistent additional agreements for a separate consideration.7 2
But there is no single section or comment addressed to this ulti-
mate question. Hints as to how a court should go about deciding
this question of intention are strewn haphazardly throughQut
topic three, but there is virtually no consideration of the question
in the Proceedings. The question may be repressed but it will not
disappear. After the discussion had long passed the question of
integration as recorded in the 1971 Proceedings, a member still
wondered, "[H]ow do you get something integrated?173 This
question can only be answered by analyzing how a court will
decide whether the parties intended their writing to be final or
final and complete-or, to use the established terminology, how
a court will decide whether the writing is (completely or par-
tially) integrated. The Restatement (Second) contains several guides
to aid courts in this effort.
D. Deciding the Question of "Integration"
I had started with the original formulation in the
First Restatement, and with Professor Corbin's notes
which left very little of the parol evidence rule, and
took, I think, a ground that went somewhat short of
what Professor Corbin would have liked. I took my lead
in this draft largely from the section of the Uniform
Commercial Code which deals with the parol evidence
rule [section 2-202] as it applies to contracts for the sale
of goods.7 4
From these remarks by the Reporter, one might expect to dis-
cover in the Restatement (Second) a position moving away from the
original Restatement's Williston position 75 but still falling short of
Corbin's virtual emasculation of the "rule '7 6 and somewhat in-
fluenced by the U.C.C. formulation. 77 It is interesting to com-
pare this drafting intention with the end product, particularly in
relation to the critical question of how a court determines
whether the parties intended their writing to be final or final
and complete.
72 Id. § 242(2).
73 48 ALI PROCEEDINGS 452 (1971).
74 Id. 442.
75 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 237 (1932); see 4 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 638.
,6 3 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 573.
,7 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-202.
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1. Proof of Integration in General
The first indication of the test suggested in the Restatement
(Second) is found in comment c to the first section of topic three,
section 235: "Whether a writing has been adopted as an inte-
grated agreement is a question of fact to be determined in ac-
cordance with all relevant evidence." That the question is
"one of fact" has long been generally conceded.7 8 The signifi-
cance of the statement is its direction that the integration deter-
mination be made "in accordance with all relevant evidence."
The flavor of Corbin is here so strong as to mask any others.
Professor Corbin has suggested that "[o]n this issue of fact, no
relevant testimony should be excluded. ' 79 Here, at the outset of
the Restatement (Second), Corbin appears to win the first and
probably the decisive battle. Corbin emphatically insisted that a
determination of "intention to integrate" is a question of fact to
be decided by the actual intention of the parties. 80 Williston
would have none of this:
[I]f the court may seek this intention from extrinsic cir-
cumstances, the very fact that the parties made a con-
temporaneous oral agreement will of itself prove that
they did not intend the writing to be a complete memo-
rial. The only question open would be whether such
a contemporaneous oral agreement was in fact made. 81
Williston had visions of this question-whether the oral
agreement was in fact made-being submitted to the jury, there-
by destroying the parol evidence rule. The underpinnings of
the rule-the sanctity of writings and the lack of juror
sophistication-would thus be uprooted.8 2 Corbin, however,
placed the burden on the proponent of the antecedent expres-
sion of agreement to prove both the fact that such an agreement
was made and that the parties did not intend their subsequent
writing to discharge the antecedent agreement.83 He recognized
that this burden would probably not be sustained in cases where
the writing appeared to be a complete and accurate expression
78 3 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 576, at 382; 4 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 633, at 1014.
79 3 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 582, at 455.
80 Id. § 582, at 456-57.
8, 4 WXLLISTON, supra note 2, § 633, at 1014 (footnote omitted).
82 Id. § 631, at 958-63.
83 3 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 582, at 457.
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of the agreement. In such cases, courts would typically find the
offered testimony "so flimsy and improbable as to justify a di-
rected verdict. '8 4 Yet, he insisted, the party denying integration
should be given the opportunity to show that the evidence as to
both questions was not "flimsy or improbable." The party
must have respectable evidence to show that the ante-
cedent agreement or expression that he alleges did in
fact exist, and also to show that it has not been dis-
charged or nullified by a new agreement-that is, that
the writing produced in court was not assented to as a
complete and accurate integration of a substituted
agreement.8 5
While the Restatement (Second) is clearly Corbin-oriented in
permitting "all relevant evidence" to determine the factual ques-
tion whether the writing has been adopted as a final expression
of the agreement,8 6 it does not clearly indicate the relevance of
whether the antecedent agreement was in fact made. The com-
ment language is curious: "Whether a writing has been adopted
as an integrated agreement is a question of fact to be determined
in accordance with all relevant evidence. The issue is distinct
from the issues of whether an agreement was made and whether
the document is genuine .... ,s1
As used in the second sentence, "an agreement" would refer
to the "integrated agreement" of the first sentence. Therefore,
the distinction suggested is between the issue whether there was
any agreement and the issue whether, assuming such an agree-
ment was in fact made, it was an integrated agreement. Proof of
the antecedent agreement presumably would be included in the
category of "all relevant evidence," because of the clear Corbin
orientation; it is unrealistic to assume that a court could effec-
tively deal with only the second question-whether the parties
intended their written expression to discharge the prior
agreement-if there was no respectable evidence of a prior
agreement. The Restatement (Second) accurately reflects the case
law in insisting that the question whether the antecedent agree-
ment was made has no relevance to the determination of
s1 Id. (footnote omitted).
85 Id. (footnote omitted).
16 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 235, comment c.
87 Id.
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integration;8 8 the former question should be one for the trier of
fact and should not be reserved to the trial judge.
It would have been desirable for the Restatement (Second) to
deal with the relevancy of determining the existence of the an-
tecedent agreement. This omission requires that the critical test
of integration be a factual determination of whether a writing
has been adopted as a final expression of the parties' agreement,
based on all the relevant evidence. Such evidence includes proof
that an agreement antecedent to the writing was in fact made
and that the parties did not intend their written expression of
agreement to discharge the prior agreement. If the burden of
proof as to these two questions is sustained, the writing will not
be deemed integrated. As to whether the agreement manifested
by an integrated writing was in fact made, that issue remains for
the trier of fact and is irrelevant to the determination of integra-
tion. This test assumes a Corbin position as to the relevancy of
determining whether the antecedent agreement was in fact
made 89 and, in the interests of clarity, distinguishes between the
integrated writing and the agreement that such writing man-
ifests.
Section 236 of the Restatement (Second) distinguishes between
completely and partially integrated agreements. If the writing is
final as to some matters, it is integrated as to those matters-that
is, it is partially integrated. If the writing is final as to all matters,
it is completely integrated. The test for determining partial ver-
sus complete integration is stated in almost the identical lan-
guage of the section 235 test-whether "a writing was or was not
adopted as a completely integrated agreement may be proved by
any relevant evidence." 90 The only difference between sections
235 and 236 is the insignificant distinction between "all" in sec-
tion 235 and "any" in section 236.
Section 235(2) unambiguously declares that the question of
integration is one for the court-a change from the original
Restatement."' The comment, however, states that "[o]rdinarily
the issue whether there is an integrated agreement is determined
by the trial judge .... - 92 The qualification is closer to the Corbin
Il See 3 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 582, at 448 n.78 and cases cited therein.
89 Id. § 582.
90 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 1, § 236, comment b (emphasis supplied).
91 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRAcTs § 228 (1932).
92 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 235, comment c.
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position. Corbin believed that, in most cases, it is probably "wise"
for the court to decide this issue of fact; but he hastened to add
that there must be many cases in which the evidence "is so nearly
equal in weight and credibility that the court will desire the aid
of a jury's verdict. If so, there is no law against getting such
aid."
93
2. The Appearance Test
Williston believed that the parties may expressly provide
that the agreement is integrated (in a merger clause, for exam-
ple) and that their expressed intention should be effectuated.
94
Corbin, on the other hand, urged that even in such a case, rec-
ognizing that the form and wording of the writing could be
decisive, the party denying the integration should always be
given the opportunity to show that the parties had not assented
to the writing as a complete integration. 95 The Restatement
(Second) recognizes the "appearance" test in section 235(3), stat-
ing that a written agreement which appears to be complete and
specific may be determined to be integrated, permitting, how-
ever, contrary evidence to establish that the parties did not in-
tend the writing to be their final expression. 96 In section 236,
"Completely and Partially Integrated Agreements," there is a
further repudiation of the Williston approach and a clear adop-
tion of the Corbin (and Wigmore) view that although a writing
apparently complete on its face may be decisive of the issue,
credible contrary evidence may be introduced to negate such a
finding.9 7 Wigmore's view is particularly evidenced by the state-
ment that "a writing cannot of itself prove its own com-
pleteness," 98 a position warmly supported by Corbin. This is
quickly followed by the Corbin philosophy: "[W]ide latitude
must be allowed for inquiry into circumstances bearing on the
intention of the parties."99
There is at this point no mention of "merger" clauses. A
comment to section 242, "Consistent Additional Terms," indi-
cates that such a clause "if agreed to is likely to conclude the
91 3 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 595, at 571.
94 4 WILLSTON, supra note 2, § 633, at 1014.
95 3 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 582, at 456-57.
96 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, §§ 235-36.
97 Id. § 236, comment b; 9 WIGMORE, supra note 32, § 2430, at 98.
618 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 236, comment b.
q9 Id.
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issue whether the agreement is completely integrated."' 00 The
phrase "if agreed to" could be directed toward a distinction be-
tween a negotiated merger clause and a printed merger clause as
part of a standardized form; it is unfortunate that this distinction
can only be inferred from the phrase. The question might well
have been considered in relation to section 237, "Standardized
Agreements"; the absence of any mention of merger clauses in
section 237 tends to negate the distinction, however.
The remainder of the merger clause comment in section
242 is confusing: "[S]uch a clause does not control the question
whether the writing was assented to as an integrated agreement
.... "101 The Reporter's Note directs attention to the Corbin
treatise, 0 2 which contains language remarkably similar to the
Restatement (Second) comment on merger clauses.' 0 3 As to the last
portion of the comment just quoted, however, the relevant por-
tion of Corbin appears to be the following: "The fact that a
written document contains one of these express provisions does
not prove that the document itself was ever assented to or ever
became operative as a contract." 0 4 The Corbin position is clear:
the existence in a writing of an express statement that the writ-
ing is completely integrated does not prove there is an agree-
ment that the parties intended to be a contract. Whether they
intended to have an enforceable agreement is an issue distinct
from the issue of integration; if they did intend to be contractu-
ally bound, however, the express provision in the writing indicat-
ing complete integration will, if assented to, be decisive proof of
the intention that their writing be a final and complete expres-
sion of their agreement. In contrast to Corbin's clarity, the Re-
statement (Second) comment language can be read to suggest that
even if a merger clause is assented to, it will not control the
question whether the parties intended their writing to be inte-
grated. It is more than probable that the comment language was
not designed to produce this result; the unfortunate language
appears attributable to the fundamental error, analyzed above,
of not distinguishing between the agreement itself and the inte-
grated writing that evidences it.105 As noted earlier, the Reporter
lo Id. § 242, comment e.
101 Id.
102 3 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 578, at 403-07.
103 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 242, comment e.
104 3 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 578, at 405.
1"5 See text accompanying notes 59-73 supra.
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felt "sorrow" in the use of the phrase "integrated agreement"
and invited suggestions for substitutes. 0 6 It is unfortunate that
none was forthcoming.
3. The Scope Test
a. Preliminary Considerations-Terminology
In section 239 (identified as the "primary" section dealing
with the parol evidence rule' 0 7), subsection (1) states the gener-
ally accepted effect of a finding that the writing is either partially
or completely integrated: inconsistent terms of prior agreements
are superseded. It is interesting that the term used is "in-
consistent."'10 8 The related section, section 241, which merely
"states an evidentiary consequence of § 239," uses the term "con-
tradict," clearly intending it to be interchangeable with "incon-
sistent."'1 9 Sections 239(1) and 241 may be viewed from differ-
ent perspectives, one substantive and one procedural: First, a
binding integrated agreement substantively discharges inconsis-
tent prior agreements; and second, evidence of such contradic-
tory terms will therefore not be admissible. If the synonymous
use of "inconsistent" and "contradictory" constituted the only
basis for a critique of sections 239(1) and 241, it would be a small
matter. There are, however, other problems.
Section 239(1) speaks only of "prior" agreements while sec-
tion 241 refers to "prior or contemporaneous agreements or
negotiations." The Reporter included "or contemporaneous" at
the suggestion of an unidentified member,"10 explaining the
original omission as follows:
I left out the "or contemporaneous" partly because
Professor Corbin was so opposed to the idea, and partly
because I don't know that anything is ever contem-
poraneous with anything else really, it either comes be-
fore or after. But it can be relatively contemporaneous,
and I think what we say here is that evidence of prior or
contemporaneous agreements or negotiations is not
admissible in evidence to contradict the term of the
106 48 ALI PROCEEDINGS 446 (1971).
107 See text accompanying notes 57-58 supra.
108 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 239.
109 Id. § 241.
110 48 ALl PROCEEDINGS 449 (1971).
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writing, that is to say, show a different agreement from
the one that the writing would show.'1 '
The term having been omitted from section 239(1), its inclu-
sion in the companion section, which merely states an eviden-
tiary consequence of section 239(1), is confusing. The Reporter
clearly was not enamored of the usage, stating the classic Corbin
reason for his opposition.' 2 Perhaps this represents the overrid-
ing spirit of compromise that restatement reporters must pur-
sue. The result, however, permits the grotesque possibility,
which hopefully will never occur, that prior, but not contem-
poraneous, inconsistent agreements will be superseded by bind-
ing integrated agreements, while both prior and contemporane-
ous agreements or negotiations will be inadmissible to contradict
the terms of a binding integrated agreement.
The situation worsens when the rationale for rejecting the
term "vary" in the Restatement (Second) is explored. 1 3 The
Reporter's preference in section 241 for "contradict" is not a
matter of great concern, and "contradict" is more precise; but his
explanation is startling: "[W]hen you admit parol evidence to
assist in interpretation, it seems to me that logically what you are
doing is varying the meaning the agreement would have if you
did not use the parol evidence to aid interpretation."'"1 4 In omit-
ting "contemporaneous" from section 239 and in only reluctantly
including it in section 241, the Reporter does not stray from the
Corbin orientation found in virtually all sections of topic three.
The stated rationale for the rejection of "vary," however, is
diametrically opposed to one of Professor Corbin's lifetime
crusades, and it is difficult to quarrel with the Corbin position:
It is sometimes said, in a case in which the written
words seem plain and clear and unambiguous, that the
words are not subject to interpretation or construction.
One who makes this statement has of necessity already
given the words an interpretation-the one that is to
him plain and clear; and in making the statementohe is
asserting that any different interpretation is "perverted"
and untrue." 5
"I Id.
112 See 3 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 577, at 400-02.
113 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 241, Reporter's Note.
114 48 ALI PROCEEDINGS 449-50 (1971).
115 Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q.
161, 171-72 (1965).
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The Reporter assumes, perhaps unwittingly, that the
agreement has a meaning apart from the evidence used to inter-
pret it. The pre-interpretation meaning thus would be "varied"
by such interpretive evidence. Corbin clearly would charge the
Reporter with interpreting the words of agreement before hav-
ing considered evidence to aid that process, and would vehe-
mently disagree that evidence introduced to interpret the terms
of the parties' expression could "vary" the meaning of their ex-
pression. Prior to the introduction of evidence, the Reporter is
suggesting, the only meaning the words can have is a "plain"
meaning. This is an archaic standard rejected by virtually all
writers,"16 many courts,"17 the Uniform Commercial Code,"18
and even the Restatement (Second) itself." 9 With more time for
reflection the Reporter probably would have modified it in ac-
cordance with the Corbin position.
b. The Scope Test
Section 239(2) states the effect of a binding, completely in-
tegrated writing: prior agreements are discharged to the extent
they are within its scope.' 20 Parties to a contract clearly may
agree that not even prior consistent additional terms are part of
their agreement. A partially integrated writing precludes only
prior inconsistent terms.' 21 The structure of sections 239(1) and
(2) is similar to that of the Uniform Commercial Code's parol
evidence sections, with the qualification that under the Restate-
ment (Second) a completely integrated agreement discharges con-
sistent additional terms only to the extent they are "within the
scope" of the completely integrated agreement. This qualifica-
tion is at best amorphous, leading one to seek assistance in the
comments, illustrations, and Reporter's Note.
Comment c to section 239 restates the qualification: in addi-
tion to finding that there is an integrated agreement and that it
is completely integrated, the court must determine that the prior
consistent terms are "within the scope of the [completely] inte-
6 See, e.g., 3 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 542; MURRAY, supra note 1, § 110; 4 WILLISTON,
supra note 2, § 609.
117 See, e.g., Hohenstein v. S.M.H. Trading Corp., 382 F.2d 530, 531-32 (5th Cir.
1967); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal.2d 33,
36-37, 442 P.2d 641, 643-44, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561, 563-64 (1968).
1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-202, Comment l(b).
"'See RESTATEIENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 227, comments a & b.
120 Id. § 239.
121 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-202.
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grated agreement."'122 "All relevant evidence" is to be considered
in making this determination, and interpretation of both the
integrated agreement and the prior agreement is required. Il-
lustration three, which follows the "scope" comment, is based on
Hayden v. Hoadley :123
In May A and B exchange properties and agree orally
that A will make certain repairs on the property to be
conveyed by A to B, the repairs to be finished by Oc-
tober 1. A and B then draw up and sign a memoran-
dum of the repair agreement, specifying all the terms
except that the memorandum is silent as to time of per-
formance. If the memorandum is a binding completely
integrated agreement, the agreement to finish by Oc-
tober 1 is discharged, and the repairs are to be finished
within a reasonable time. The oral agreement as to Oc-
tober 1 may be relevant evidence as to what is a reason-
able time.1
24
The phrase "[i]f the memorandum is a binding completely inte-
grated agreement" is curious. There is a substantial question
whether a memorandum that omits a term such as the time for
performance can be a completely integrated agreement. The use
of the illustration and the holding of the case indicate an affir-
mative response. Professor Corbin not only disagrees conceptu-
ally but also insists that the weight of authority is opposed to this
position. 125 It is difficult to quarrel with Corbin's view that judi-
cial gap-fillers, such as a reasonable-time term, do not constitute
any part of the "integration" that is supposedly protected by the
parol evidence rule. 26 That the writing is not integrated with
respect to such omitted terms may be shown by what amounts to
a negative "appearance" test. The matter is simply not men-
tioned in the writing and, using the Wigmore aid, 27 the evi-
dence is presumably admissible because it neither contradicts,
varies, nor adds to the terms of the writing. The burden is still on
the proponent of the time agreement to prove it sufficiently.
122 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 239, comment c.
123 94 Vt. 345, 111 A. 343 (1920).
124 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 239, illustration 3.
12' See 3 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 593, at 556-67 ("By the weight of authority, sup-
ported by the better reason, oral testimony is admissible to prove that a time or place was
agreed on and to rebut the usual presumptions and inferences that would otherwise
prevail.").
126 Id. § 593.
127 9 WIGMORE, supra note 32, § 2430.
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The writing is, at best, partially integrated with respect to the
terms contained therein. If the Restatement (Second) had rejected
the rationale and holding of Hayden v. Hoadley one of the bound-
aries of the "scope" of the integrated agreement would thereby
have been clearly identified. As interpreted by illustration three,
the Hayden doctrine is conceptually deficient and does not clarify
the meaning and application of the "scope" concept. The other
illustration 28 is somewhat more helpful, though the facts seem
to indicate that the writing is only partially integrated so that
consistent additional terms would have been admissible anyway.
This amounts to nothing more than a statement that consistent
additional terms are not discharged if the agreement is partially
integrated but that they are discharged if the agreement is com-
pletely integrated. Because the "scope" qualification is unneces-
sary to arrive at this analysis, how does the qualification operate
to permit evidence of consistent additional terms not within the
scope of the completely integrated writing to be considered as
part of the agreement?
4. The Natural Omission Test
There is a hint in the Reporter's Note to section 239 that
"scope" really refers to the Williston test. 2 9 Though following a
"But cf.," the Reporter paraphrases language from the well-
known case of Mitchill v. Lath:'3 0 "[P]rior oral agreement dis-
charged if parties would 'ordinarily be expected to embody' it in
the writing."' 3 ' Reinforcing this hint is section 239(2)'s compan-
ion section, section 242, subsection 2(b) of which clearly sets
forth the Williston test for admissibility of consistent additional
terms.132 Section 242 precludes evidence of consistent additional
terms when the binding agreement is completely integrated (the
evidentiary consequence of section 239(2)) but adds:
An agreement is not completely integrated if the writ-
ing omits a consistent additional agreed term which is
(a) agreed to for separate consideration, or
(b) such a term as in the circumstances might
naturally be omitted from the writing.' 33
128 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 1, § 239, illustration 4.
129 4 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 638.
130 247 N.Y. 377, 381, 160 N.E. 646, 647 (1928).
131 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 1, § 239, Reporter's Note to comment c.
132 Id. §§ 239, 242.
133 Id. § 242(2).
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Subsection 2(a) is consistent with case law, which allows
proof of consistent agreements not evidenced by the writing
where there is separate consideration for the consistent addi-
tional term. 134 Subsection 2(b) is the Williston test, and the Re-
porter was well aware of the acceptance of the Williston test at
this point and of the concomitant rejection of any Corbin opposi-
tion thereto.1 35 Furthermore, the Reporter illustrates this use of
the Williston test by reviewing the four-to-three holding in Mitch-
ill v. Lath,136 which he accurately indicates is a prime illustration
of the "naturally omitted" criterion.13 7 The extrinsic agreement
in that case provided for removal of an unsightly icehouse, al-
legedly as part of a total agreement to purchase real estate. The
question that divided the court was whether parties, situated as
were these, might naturally and normally include the icehouse
agreement in the writing; the majority held that such parties
would, and therefore excluded the evidence of this prior oral
agreement. As suggested by the Reporter, both the majority and
the dissenters accepted the "naturally omitted" principle,'138 dis-
agreeing only as to its application.
Comments c and d to section 242 are of some value in de-
termining the operation of the "scope" qualification to section
239(2). 39 Comment c notes that subsection 2(a) of section 242
may be regarded as a species of subsection 2(b), the generic
"natural omission" test. The great difficulty in reconciling sec-
tion 242(2) with section 239(2) is the statement in section 242(2)
that a consistent additional term that is naturally omitted or spe-
cifically agreed to for a separate consideration (and, therefore,
naturally omitted) results in a determination that the "agreement
is not completely integrated." Section 239(2) deals exclusively
with completely integrated agreements and discharges any con-
sistent additional term within the scope of such an agreement.
To determine whether a consistent additional term is within the
scope of the completely integrated agreement, the test that cries
out for recognition is the "natural omission" test: If a consistent
additional term is omitted from the writing but is of the kind
134 See, e.g., Armstrong v. Cavanagh, 183 Iowa 140, 166 N.W. 673 (1918); Sermuks v.
Automatic Aluminum Heel Co., 256 Mass. 478, 153 N.E. 8 (1926).
"5 See 48 ALl PROCEEDINGS 454-55 (1971).
136 247 N.Y. 377, 160 N.E. 646 (1928).
17 48 ALI PROCEEDINGS 455 (1971).
138 See Mitchill v. Lath, 247 N.Y. 377, 160 N.E. 646 (1928).
139 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 242, comments c & d.
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reasonable parties might naturally omit, the consistent additional
term is not within the scope of the completely integrated agree-
ment. Section 242(2) does not permit this analysis, however, be-
cause it clearly indicates that an agreement is not completely
integrated if the writing omits a consistent additional term that
parties might naturally omit. Thus, if a naturally omitted consis-
tent additional term is proved, under section 242(2) the agree-
ment can only be partially integrated and the consistent addi-
tional term is admissible. The Restatement (Second), therefore,
leaves a conceptual void in section 239(2). A consistent additional
term outside the scope of the completely integrated agreement
cannot be a term that is naturally omitted from the writing; if it
is, then the writing is only partially integrated. Thus the unan-
swered question remains: What is a consistent additional term
outside the scope of the completely integrated agreement?
Because the question is not expressly considered in the Re-
statement (Second), it is appropriate to consider the apparent goals
sought to be achieved through these sections. If the parties to a
contract have reduced even part of their agreement to writing
with the intention that such part be evidenced exclusively by the
writing, the writing is partially integrated and no contradiction
of the writing will be permitted. 140 Because they did not intend
to state their entire agreement in writing, additional terms con-
sistent with their partially integrated writing should be provable.
If, however, the parties intended to reduce their entire agree-
ment to writing, neither party should be faced with the necessity
of litigating an alleged prior agreement not evidenced by the
writing even though that agreement is not inconsistent with the
terms of the writing. 1 4 Thus the parties should be able to agree
that the writing is complete and final, and that intention should
be enforced. Both the Restatement (Second) and the Uniform
Commercial Code deal with these purposes as the foregoing
analysis suggests, 142 but each also admits the possibility that there
may be some kinds of consistent additional terms which the par-
ties would not naturally include in the most complete writing of
their agreement. They therefore recognize two types of consis-
tent additional terms: (a) those the parties would naturally in-
14 See 3 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 581; 4 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 633.
141 See 3 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 576; 4 WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 631.
142 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note I, § 235 & comment b; UNIFORM
COMMIIERCIAL CODE § 2-202.
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clude in the writing, and (b) those the parties would naturally
omit from the writing. Once it is recognized that parties might
have a prior agreement that they would not naturally include in
the writing, the inevitable conclusion is that evidence of such
consistent additional terms must be admitted to give the propo-
nent the opportunity to prove that such a consistent additional
agreement was made. Thus the consistent additional terms in (a)
will be excluded while those in (b) will be admitted.
The U.C.C. formulation does not deal with this matter at all
in the section language. 143 Section 2-202 merely distinguishes
final expressions from complete and exclusive expressions of
agreement. The former preclude contradictory terms and the
latter preclude even consistent additional terms. The section
language stops at this point; however, a comment does confront
the problem: "If the [consistent] additional terms are such that,
if agreed upon, they would certainly have been included in the
document in the view of the court, then evidence of their alleged
making must be kept from the trier of fact."'
44
This is the Williston test in a different garb. "Would cer-
tainly" can be reasonably interpreted to mean that which reason-
able parties would naturally and normally include in the writing.
Suppose the terms are such that they would not certainly have
been included in the document? The proponent of such extrin-
sic terms is then permitted to introduce evidence of their exis-
tence and to attempt to convince the trier of fact that such a
prior agreement was made. If the terms are of a type that would
certainly be included in the document, they are inadmissible if
the parties intended the document to be a complete and final
statement of their agreement. The Restatement (Second), following
the thrust of the original Restatement's section 240, describes the
circumstance in which such consistent additional terms might
naturally be omitted from an otherwise final and complete
document as follows:
This situation is especially likely to arise when the writ-
ing is in a standardized form which does not lend itself
to the insertion of additional terms. Thus agreements
collateral to a negotiable instrument if written on the
instrument might destroy its negotiability or otherwise
make it less acceptable to third parties; the instrument
143 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-202.
144 Id., Comment 3 (emphasis supplied).
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may not have space for the additional term. Leases and
conveyances are also often in a standard form which
lead naturally to the omission of terms which are not
standard. These examples are not exclusive. . . .Even
though the admission does not seem natural, evidence of the
consistent additional term is admissible unless the court finds
that the writing was intended as a complete and exclusive
statement of the terms of the agreement.145
The last sentence of the comment was emphasized to focus
on the apparent contradiction. The only preclusion to the admis-
sion of evidence of consistent additional terms occurs when the
parties intend their writing as complete and exclusive. Indeed,
when the determination is made that the writing is final but
incomplete, it is an inescapable conclusion that some consistent
additional terms would naturally be omitted. Can one similarly
conclude, however, that all consistent additional terms would
necessarily be included in a complete, final, and exclusive writ-
ing? Section 239(2)146 clearly implies that it is possible to have a
completely integrated agreement and still permit evidence of
consistent additional terms that would be naturally omitted from
the writing because not within its scope. On the other hand,
section 242(2)147 indicates that proof of such naturally omitted
terms precludes any possibility of determining that the writing is
completely integrated. Again the comment to section 242 fudges
the situation by indicating that once it is determined that certain
consistent additional terms were naturally omitted from the writ-
ing, "[I]t is not necessary to consider further ...whether the
agreement is completely integrated ....14
The Restatement (Second) suggests both answers to the same
question because (1) it maintains a distinction between the effects
of a final writing, which will preclude evidence of inconsistent
additional terms, and of a complete and final writing, which will
preclude evidence of any additional terms-the same distinction
set forth in the U.C.C.-at the same time that it (2) perpetuates
the Williston belief, also embodied in the U.C.C., that there are
some kinds of consistent additional terms-those naturally
"I RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 242, comment d (emphasis supplied).
-"Id. § 239(2) ("A binding completely integrated agreement discharges prior
agreements to the extent that they are within its scope.").
147 Id. § 242(2).
I4s Id. § 242, comment d.
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omitted-that should be provable even when the writing is not
only final but final and complete. It is plausible to suggest that a
writing is not final and complete if certain terms would naturally
be omitted therefrom; hence section 242(2). But to maintain a
distinction between merely final writings on the one hand and
final and complete writings on the other, section 239(2) contem-
plates a completely integrated agreement that would admit only
such consistent additional terms as are "within the scope" of the
complete and exclusive statement of the parties' agreement. It is
the Williston position that causes the problem. In defense of the
Restatement (Second), not only is the "natural omission" test set
forth in the original Restatement149 and repeated in the Code
comment; 50 it is also supported by a considerable body of case
law. 15' Thus its deletion from the draft of the Restatement
(Second) would have been unacceptable in terms of the overrid-
ing purpose of a restatement. In addition, there are lawyers,
apparently including the Reporter, who see merit in a continua-
tion of this test. 52 Yet it is fair to suggest that the test will
operate to permit evidence of consistent additional terms in the
face of what appears to be a complete and final statement of the
parties' agreement only where the terms are clearly the kind that
the parties would not have included in the document. In this
light, the language of the Code comment ("would certainly")
appears more apt than the "naturally omitted" phraseology of
the Restatement (Second). There are undoubtedly myriad drafting
approaches the Restatement (Second) could have pursued; one ap-
proach, which would have avoided the present confusion, is
found in my hypothetical drafts of sections 239(2) and 242(2):
Section 239(2): A binding completely integrated agree-
ment discharges prior agreements to the extent that
they would naturally [or "would certainly"] have been
included in such a completely integrated agreement.
Section 242(2): A completely integrated agreement does
not preclude evidence of a consistent additional agreed
term which is
(a) agreed to for separate consideration, or
(b) such a term as in the circumstances might
naturally be omitted from the writing.
149 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 237 (1932).
150 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-202, Comment 3.
51 See 3 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 583, at 471-74 n.92, and cases cited therein.
M52 See 48 ALI PROCEEDINGS 455 (1971).
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These suggested drafts are anything but ideal. Drafts more
closely conforming to my analysis would necessitate the redraft-
ing and restructuring of virtually all sections in topic three of
chapter nine. Distinctions between the agreement and the writ-
ing evidencing the agreement should, among other changes, be
stressed throughout topic three, paralleling the distinction found
in the U.C.C. version of the rule.153 The suggested drafts of
sections 239(2) and 242(2) are submitted for two reasons: (1)
they do no violence to the overall structure of topic three and
the modifications of language are easily accomplished; (2) more
importantly, they set forth more precisely, and without am-
biguity or contradiction, the apparent intention of the Reporter
and those who assisted him in preparing these subsections. The
drafts permit the continued distinction between the effect of a
final but incomplete (partially integrated) writing and that of a
final and complete (completely integrated) writing. As the Re-
porter recognized, this distinction is critical.' 54 Simultaneously,
these drafts allow application of the Williston test in the
peripheral area of consistent additional terms that would cer-
tainly or naturally be omitted from the completely integrated
writing, thus appeasing those who favor the Williston test, re-
flecting the case law applying it, and maintaining symmetry with
the U.C.C. statement. At the same time, the drafts would do little
violence to the overall Corbin flavor of the Restatement (Second).
III. STANDARDIZED AGREEMENTS
A. The Underlying Problem
Section 237 of the Restatement (Second) has no antecedent in
the original Restatement, though some relation to the old section
70 may be inferred. 55 Captioned "Standardized Agreements,"
section 237 is a reaction to the massive use of standardized,
printed forms or "pad" documents evidencing a contract.15 6 It is
an essential section within topic three because any exploration of
the effects of adopting a writing should include consideration of
13 UNIFORM".I COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-202.
,-, See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 242, Reporter's Note.
1,5 See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 70 (1932) ("One who makes a written offer
which is accepted, or who manifests acceptance of the terms of a writing which he should
reasonably understand to be an offer or proposed contract, is bound by the contract,
though ignorant of the terms of the writing or of its proper interpretation.").
l 5; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 237.
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the adoption of standarized writings. There is, moreover, an
intimate relationship between section 237 and the doctrine of
unconscionability: 157 section 234 is mentioned in two of the
comments to section 237158 and there is a clear recognition of
this relationship in the 1970 Proceedings.1 59 Thus a complete
analysis of section 237 would require an equally complete
analysis of the doctrine of unconscionability as set forth in sec-
tion 234 and of the relationshil between the two sections. Such
an investigation deserves separate inquiry and is beyond the
scope of this Article. Any discussion of topic three, however,
cannot omit an exploration of the more troublesome aspects of
this new section.
The underlying problem confronted by section 237 is sug-
gested in comment b: "A party who makes regular use of a
standardized form of agreement does not ordinarily expect his
customers to understand or even to read the standard terms." If
it is not reasonable to expect parties to understand or even to
read such boilerplate, the question arises whether parties are
bound by the terms found in such standardized documents.
Beyond the fact that the printed form is typically neither under-
stood nor even read, certain other facts are also unassailable.
Standardized writings are here to stay, their utility is much ad-
mired, and they are essential to our complicated exchange
society. 160 The question to be confronted is this: How should the
law react to writings, allegedly evidencing contracts, that will
continue to be used but will not be understood or even read? If
the certainty and stability of written manifestations of agreement
are to be maintained-if "contracts" are to be worth the prover-
bial paper on which they are written-parties must be bound by
what they sign, even if what they sign is a standardized writing
they neither understood nor read. Yet the writing has never
been anything more than evidence of the agreement; 16' a for-
tiori, if the writing is normally executed absent understanding of
its fine print provisions, it is less worthy as evidence of the true
agreement. Much of the underlying philosophy of article two of
the Uniform Commercial Code can be understood on this basis.
157 Id. § 234.
151 Id. § 237, comments c &f.
159 47 ALl PROCEEDINGS 523-24 (1970).
160 See Murray, Intention over Terms: An Exploration of UCC 2-207 and New Section 60,
Restatement of Contracts, 37 FORD. L. REv. 317 (1969).
161 See text accompanying notes 1-4 supra.
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The Code section dealing with unconscionability, based upon the
need for preventing "unfair surprise," is an obvious manifesta-
tion of this philosophy. 162 A less obvious but still clear manifesta-
tion can be seen in the controversial section dealing with the
"battle of the forms,' 63 as well as in the sections on disclaimer of
express warranties, 164 on limitation of remedies, 65 and even in
the generic provisions on contract formation. 66 All of these sec-
tions can be analyzed, in terms of the principal thrust of article
two, as attempts to achieve a more precise and fair identification
of the actual or presumed assent of the parties-a process that
requires an emphatic understanding that the writing evidencing
the agreement is only evidence of that assent. 167
Standardized writings are particularly suspect in identifying
the true intent of the parties. Absent an understanding of most
boilerplate provisions, as Llewellyn recognized, there can be no
conscious assent to such terms. Conscious assent can be given
only to "dickered" terms, the terms reasonable parties normally
and consciously negotiate. As to the boilerplate, "blanket assent"
may be presumed as to any "decent" terms; but such "blanket
assent" will not be presumed as to "indecent" or, in the language
of the Restatement (Second), "bizarre or oppressive" boilerplate
provisions.'
68
B. Reasonable Expectations of the Assenting Party
The Restatement (Second) attempts to unify these difficult
concepts in section 237. Subsection one contains a qualified
statement of the general rule that a party is bound by what he
signs. The qualification is substantial: "[W]here a party to an
agreement signs or otherwise manifests assent to a writing and
has reason to believe that like writings are regularly used to embody terms
of agreements of the same type .... -169 The focus here is on the
signer, the party assenting to the standardized agreement. If that
party signs a standard form document, and if he should under-
stand the document to be typical of those used in the kind of
transaction involved, he is said to have adopted as an integrated
162 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302.
163 Id. § 2-207.
164 1d. § 2-316.
165 Id. § 2-719.
166 Id. § 2-204.
167 See Murray, supra note 43.
168 K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 362-71 (1960).
169 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 237(1) (emphasis supplied).
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writing the standard printed terms which he has neither read
nor understood. There is little discussion of subsection one in
the Proceedings, the Reporter having been anxious to move on
to subsection three.17 0 The Reporter did note, somewhat face-
tiously, that he had "stated first a rather reactionary proposition,
which is subsection (1); that is, when you agree to a standard
agreement, you agree to it, and that means everything that's in
it, subject, of course, to qualifying terms."'171 This leaves some
ambiguity as to the intention of the draftsman in relation to the
qualification. Presumably the required showing is that the assent-
ing party reasonably understood the form agreement to be the
kind typically used in like transactions. As to consumers, it might
be difficult to show that such a reasonable belief existed in cer-
tain transactions. The qualification could, however, explain the
underlying philosophy of the section: If the assenting party has
reason to believe that the standard form that he is signing is the
typical standard form used in such transactions, he is assenting
only to that which is typically found in such forms and not to any
"indecent," "oppressive," or "bizarre" terms that might be in-
cluded therein. 72 Only the typical (or standard) terms are
adopted by the assenting party as his integrated agreement. If
this analysis is plausible, it suggests some interesting possibilities.
Consider, for example, a party supplied with a standard
form that, without his reading or understanding it, appears to be
the same kind of form he and others similarly situated have
signed in similar past transactions. With reason to believe he is
signing the usual form, the party signs a document containing in
fine print unusual provisions he had no reason to believe were
included. An example of such a bizarre term, suggested in an
earlier exploration of the same concept, 173 may, though seem-
ingly absurd, help to clarify the concept. Assume a contract for
the sale of a new automobile evidenced by what appears to be
the standard printed form but which contains an unnoticed
boilerplate provision:
The parties hereby agree that if, during the first year of
operation of this automobile, the automobile is operated
170 See 47 ALI PROCEEDINGS 525 (1970).
171 Id. 524.
172 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 237, commentf; K. LLEWELLYN, supra
note 168, at 370.
173 See, e.g., MURRAY, supra note 1, § 353; Murray, supra note 43.
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on any Tuesday afternoon by a party wearing a red
necktie, all rights in the automobile will be forfeited by
the owner and ownership of the automobile will revert
to the seller.
It cannot be gainsaid that prior to the Uniform Commercial
Code and the Restatement (Second) even the most literal-minded
court would have refused to enforce this provision. Myriad con-
clusory reasons might have been stated for such a refusal, includ-
ing a "shock the conscience" or "public policy" test; the principle
that "the law abhors forfeitures"; and even more traditional
"covert tools" such as a "failure of consideration" test.174 A few
courts might simply have found that assent was lacking. There is
precedent for refusing to bind a party by unexpected provisions
inconspicuously inserted in a standard form. 17 5 Assuming the
applicability of the Uniform Commercial Code to such a case
today, it would be appropriate to fit the holding and rationale
under the rubric of unconscionability as set forth in section
2-302. While admitting the imperfections of a statutory ap-
proach to such problems, Llewellyn would thus excise "indecent"
provisions from sale-of-goods contracts.'
76
The determination of unconscionability depends, essentially,
upon a finding of a lack of assent.' 77 Assent may be lacking
either because a party was reasonably unaware of an unex-
pected, material risk-shifting provision which he did not read, or
because he could not have understood the provision had he read
it. If, however, such a provision were made clear, either by re-
drafting it in comprehensible form or by explaining the provi-
sion prior to the signing, assent may still be lacking because
awareness alone does not supply assent. Section 237 is not ad-
dressed to the "contract of adhesion" (a phrase eschewed by the
Restatement (Second)),' 78 in which one party must adhere to the
terms of a contract dictated to him by a party with awesome
bargaining power; it is apparently designed to deal exclusively
with lack of assent arising from inclusion in the printed form of
unexpected, bizarre, oppressive, or "indecent" provisions of
174 See MURRAY, supra note 1, § 354, and cases cited therein.
1'5 Cutler Corp. v. Latshaw, 374 Pa. 1, 97 A.2d 234 (1953).
176 K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 168, at 362-71.
177 See generally Murray, supra note 43.
"" See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 1, § 237, comment f; MURRAY, SUpra note
1, § 350.
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which the signer would not reasonably be aware. Presumably the
lack of assent due to a "take it or leave it" imposition of oppres-
sive terms is to be considered exclusively under the uncon-
scionability section, section 234. This is made reasonably clear in
comment c to section 237, wherein section 234 is mentioned as
an example of how standard terms may be superseded for
reasons other than those set forth in section 237:
The obvious danger of overreaching has resulted in
government regulation of insurance policies, bills of lad-
ing, retail installment sales, small loans, and other par-
ticular types of contracts. Regulation sometimes in-
cludes administrative review of standard terms, or even
prescription of terms. Apart from such regulation, standard
terms imposed by one party are enforced. But standard terms
may be superseded by separately negotiated or added
terms (§ 229), they are construed against the draftsman
(§ 232), and they are subject to the overriding obligation
of good faith (§ 231) and to the power of the court to
refuse to enforce an unconscionable contract or term
(§ 234). Moreover, various contracts and terms are
against public policy and unenforceable.
179
The emphasized sentence is curious but may suggest that, apart
from such regulation, the general rule is that standard terms are
enforced except when, inter alia, they are determined to be un-
conscionable. The general rule is also qualified by section 237
itself: Even if a term is not unconscionable and is not subject to
judicial excision through separately negotiated or added terms,
construction against the draftsman, a finding of bad faith, or a
determination that enforcement would be against public policy, a
party may still escape from the provision if, because it was out-
side the scope of what he would reasonably expect to find in a
standardized writing evidencing the particular transaction, the
party cannot be said to have assented to the provision.'8 0
C. The Reasonable Expectations of the Other Party
The test for determining whether a term is outside the
scope of terms that could reasonably be expected to be included
in a typical printed form is found in subsection three. Unlike
179 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 1, § 237, comment c (emphasis supplied).
80 Id. § 237.
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subsection one, where the emphasis was upon the assenting
party's "reason to believe," the test in subsection three focuses
upon what the other party had reason to believe: "Where the
other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such
assent would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a
particular term, the term is not part of the agreement."
1 8'
A number of noteworthy implications can be drawn from
this language. The current draft is a modification of section
237(3) as it originally appeared in the Fifth Tentative Draft:
"Where the other party has reason to know that the party man-
ifesting such assent believes or assumes that the writing does
not contain a particular term, the term is not part of the
agreement."'
182
Professor Farnsworth was troubled by the change from this
original draft to the current subsection:
I am not sure but what [Reporter Braucher] gave up
too easily on [his] original language. I'm troubled by the
apparently simple form that contains a clause in the
back of it, perhaps a more or less innocuous clause, but
one which, it turns out, because of later events, is im-
portant to the party signing. It is quite possible ... that
under Mr. Willard's language it would not be clear that
he would not have signed the agreement had he known
that this clause was added; and yet under your original
language it would not be a part of the contract.1
83
The Reporter responded:
As I read Mr. Willard's formulation, it doesn't require
the impossible showing of what the party would have
done if. What it requires is that the stronger party, who
submits the adhesion contract or prepares the standard
form, have reason to believe that the party would not
assent if he knew about this. I think it's an impossible
burden of proof to put on somebody that he would
have refused to sign if he had known about this. All this
requires is that there be reason to believe that that's so.




Id. § 237(3); cf. id. § 237(1).
182 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237(3) (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1970).
183 47 ALl PROCEEDINGS 527-28 (1970). The change of language was proposed by
Charles Willard of New York. See id. 525.
184 Id. 528.
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Professor Farnsworth suggested the "now out of date exam-
ple" of the bank signature card containing on the back a clause
dealing with stop payment orders. Applying the Willard formu-
lation of section 237(3), the clause would be part of the agree-
ment; but under the original (Braucher) draft it would not. Pro-
fessor Farnsworth concluded: "[A]ssuming this is a clause which
the party signing would not be expected to come across... your
original rule is a better rule.
'18 5
Mr. Willard then intervened:
I think the answer may be, sir, that many of us have
signed contracts containing provisions that we wish
weren't in there, but on balance we thought: All right,
we want the contract, and we have to take the good with
the bad. And I want to make it as clear as I can that
when you get into the area of unconscionability, then
you are under § 234.186
This was immediately followed by further explanation from
the Reporter, who illustrated the point by referring to a case
involving a bank signature card containing a provision that man-
ifests the signer's agreement to waive a jury trial.18 7 Recalling the
holding of the appellate court that the clause was not uncons-
cionable, the Reporter stated:
Whether it's unconscionable or not seems to me to de-
pend on a whole series of value judgments that I wasn't
able to get enough certainty on to include here, but I
would hate to have that turn on the question whether
the party assumed that there was no such waiver. As-
suming it's a perfectly legible provision and it has not
been concealed in any way and he signs the card, and
there it is, it seems to me the proper thing to pay atten-
tion to is whether the clause is oppressive in some way,
and not this notion that it's unexpected at that point.
I think the same thing would go for the stop pay-
ment clause, that most of the cases that threw out the
stop payment disclaimer of liability on the part of the
bank did so on the direct ground that it either was




187 David v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 55 Misc. 2d 1080, 287 N.Y.S.2d 503
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1968), rei'd, 59 Misc. 2d 248, 298 N.Y.S.2d 847 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (per
curiam).
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and not on the ground that it hadn't been agreed to;
and that's what I think we're talking about here.
88
Professor Farnsworth's statements 89 suggest a workable
rule: If the clause or term in the standard form is one the
signing party would not reasonably expect to be included, he will
not be said to have assented to it and, therefore, it will not be
part of the agreement. The original (Braucher) draft of section
237(3)190 can be so interpreted. If the signing party would not
reasonably expect the term to be part of the form, the other
party would have reason to know that the signer believed or
assumed that the writing did not contain that particular term.
The ultimate criterion appears to be whether the signer as a
reasonable party under all of the circumstances would have ex-
pected such a term in the printed form. Thus even under the
Braucher draft, which Farnsworth prefers, one may wonder why
the test was not simply stated in terms of the reasonable expecta-
tions of the signer. Wonder aside, the Braucher test can be made
workable. The Willard test, however, is substantially different
and much more difficult to apply.
One interpretation of this test (the present version of section
237(3)) is that it simply requires a finding that the assenting
party would not have signed if he had known of the term in the
printed form. As the Reporter emphasizes in his first response to
Farnsworth, 19' this is incorrect. Such a showing would be impos-
sible, and if submitted to a jury as a question of fact, could result
in a rewriting of the "contract" to satisfy the proclivities of the
trier of fact. Rather, the test is whether the "stronger party, who
submits the adhesion contract or prepares the standard form,
has reason to believe that the party would not assent if he knew
about this." The Reporter's choice of language is fascinating. He
obviously contemplates a "stronger party"-one who dictates an
"adhesion contract" and thus has the superior bargaining posi-
tion that permits such compulsion. With that kind of awesome
bargaining power, what difference does it make whether the
signer knows of the term? If he has no choice, if he must adhere,
he does not assent to the oppressive term whether he knows of it
188 47 ALl PROCEEDINGS 529 (1970).
189 Text accompanying notes 183 & 185 supra.
190 Text accompanying note 182 supra.
'9' Text accompanying note 184 supra.
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or not. If he has not truly assented to an oppressive term, quaere:
is the term unenforceable because it is unconscionable?
The confusion of concepts is further demonstrated by the
remainder of the Reporter's first response to Farnsworth' 92 and
by comment language to the adopted (Willard) draft. The only
requirement is that the nonsigning party have "reason to be-
lieve" the assenting party would not have signed had he known
of the term. But when would the nonsigner have such "reason to
believe"? Commentf to section 237 contains the following expla-
nation: "Reason to believe may be inferred from the fact that the
term is bizarre or oppressive, from the fact that it eviscerates the
non-standard terms explicitly agreed to, or from the fact that it
eliminates the dominant purpose of the transaction." Suppose
the form contains such a "bizarre or oppressive" term-the kind
of term the nonsigner would have reason to believe the other
party would not assent to if he knew about it. How does the
nonsigner ascertain that that term becomes part of the agree-
ment? The Reporter's response is simple: "[T]he obvious remedy
is to flag it in some way."'193 This suggests that the term be made
conspicuous-that it be "brought home" to the assenting party.
Suppose it is "brought home" or "flagged." If the signer is not
forced to adhere to the term-that is, if he can procure the
goods or services elsewhere without the term-presumably he
will not sign. If the signer is not forced to adhere, the nonsigner
does not have superior bargaining power. He is not the
"stronger party" and has not submitted an "adhesion contract."
It is important to distinguish lack of assent due to a party's
signing the standard form under the reasonable expectation that
such a term would not be included, from lack of assent arising
where the signer, whether he knew of the term or not, would
sign because he had no choice.
Willard's reply is difficult to comprehend. 94 He appears to
be addressing the situation in which the "bad" term is flagged,
because he contemplates a signer who "thought" he had to take
the good with the bad and thus signed knowing that the "bad"
term was included. Under Willard's version of section 237(3) the
signer is bound, but the term is presumably still subject to exci-
sion under the unconscionability section, section 234.
192 Id.
193 See id.
194 Text accompanying note 186 supra.
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The Reporter's response to Willard is again confusing.195 As
to the waiver-of-jury provision illustration, he seems to be saying
that a legible, non-concealed version of this provision cannot be
characterized as "unexpected" and, therefore, that section 237(3)
would not apply to it. Rather, it would be proper "to pay atten-
tion to ... whether the clause is oppressive in some way. . . ." If
it were oppressive, then might it be excised under section 234 as
unconscionable? As suggested above, one of the facts from which
"reason to believe" may be inferred under section 237(3) is that
the term is "oppressive." The final paragraph of the Reporter's
second response' 96 suggests that stop-payment clauses are to be
similarly treated. He then resorts to the rationales for declaring
such clauses unenforceable: lack of consideration or a finding
that they are against public policy. He emphasizes that courts did
not excise such clauses "on the ground that they hadn't been
agreed to; and that's what I think we're talking about here." But
at this point section 237(3) is concerned with what has or has not
been agreed to.
The Reporter's response simply ignores the documented
analysis that courts often used "covert tools" to arrive at con-
scionable results, an analysis recognized in the Uniform Com-
mercial Code' 97 and adopted by the Restatement (Second) itself.' 98
One such covert tool was a finding that a required contractual
element-consideration, for example-was lacking. Perhaps the
ultimate covert tool was a determination that the clause violated
that ineffable standard of "public policy." The fact is that if
waiver-of-jury or stop-payment clauses would not be expected by
the reasonable party asked to sign the signature card, then they
have not been assented to. That such clauses are "flagged" may
only mean that they are in bold or conspicuous print. Like
disclosure-of-warranty clauses, exclusion-of-consequential-dam-
ages clauses, or similar "oppressive" terms, even when physi-
cally conspicuous, may still remain substantively "unflagged"
since a reasonable party may not understand such terms.199 Fi-
nally, even when these clauses are physically and substantively
conspicuous, the signer may have no choice as to oppressive
terms if the stronger party can dictate them. In that event, the
195 Text accompanying note 188 supra.
196 Id.
19 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302 & Comments.
198 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 234 & comments.
19' Murray, supra note 10, at 4.
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signer does not agree to them. Judicial findings of lack of con-
sideration or of public policy violations are conclusory and un-
necessary here, since the basic requirement of mutual assent is
lacking.
The difficulty manifested in the effort of the Restatement
(Second) to deal with the pervasive problem of distinguishing
between binding and non-binding standard form terms should
not detract from the necessity of confronting this problem. In
section 237(3) the goal is perceptible: to prevent a party from
being bound to printed terms that he would not expect to be
included in the standard form. An inference may even be drawn
that the draftsmen of the Restatement (Second) intended section
237(3) to include, as part of the agreement, terms that would
normally be found in the standard form but which were
excluded. 200 This suggests that an attempt was made to state that
parties are bound by what the signer reasonably expects to be
included in the standardized agreement form-no more and no
less. The true circle of assent is thereby identified as the parties'
reasonable expectations of the terms evidencing their agree-
ment, regardless of the actual terms in the printed form. Section
237 is nothing more than an effort to deal with a species of
unconscionability. It may be desirable to include it as a separate
section. Its placement in juxtaposition to section 234, however,
would not only have been natural but would also have relieved
much of the concern manifested in the Proceedings. 20 1 More
importantly, the recognition that the underlying question in both
areas is one of assent would have remedied most of the problems
already discussed.
There may be cases in which the "bad" or "oppressive" term
would not have been agreed to had the signer known of it. The
unrealistic example of the forfeiture of the automobile through
wearing a red necktie on a certain day of the week is certainly a
bizarre term that a signer would not reasonably expect to be
included in the standard form.20 2 Since other automobile dealers
do not include such terms in their forms, if the clause had been
flagged (physically and substantively) the buyer presumably
would not have signed but would have purchased an automobile
elsewhere. Absent such complete flagging, the term should not
200 See 47 ALI PROCEEDINGS 526 (1970); text accompanying notes 182-88 supra.
201 See 47 ALI PROCEEDINGS 534-35 (1970).
202 See text accompanying notes 173-74 supra.
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be binding because a signer would not reasonably expect it. Simi-
larly, illustration two to section 237203 is based on the well-known
parcel check case 20 4 wherein the small check contained "con-
tract" terms. The terms are not part of the agreement because
the bailor would not reasonably expect to find such terms on an
identification ticket. As suggested elsewhere, courts sympathize
with signers in such transactions and have little difficulty in hold-
ing such unexpected terms to be outside the circle of assent. 20 5
Whether such terms could be forced upon a bailor if he had
been made aware of them is another question, the resolution of
which depends upon all of the surrounding circumstances.
Evidence of such surrounding circumstances is often availa-
ble. Thus illustration five to the unconscionability section, section
234,206 is based upon the well-known case of Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co.,207 universally considered under the rubric
of unconscionability. As set forth in the illustration, the seller of
retail goods knows that the buyer is a woman of limited educa-
tion who, separated from her husband, supports her seven chil-
dren through public assistance grants. After thirteen purchases
totaling twelve hundred dollars over five years, her account bal-
ance is $164. She purchases a stereo at $514 and signs the
retailer's standard form containing, as part of the fine print, an
"add-on" clause, the effect of which is to keep a balance on each
item until all items are paid for. When Mrs. Williams defaults,
the retailer seeks to repossess all items sold to her over the five-
year period. The illustration concludes that such a clause (or the
entire contract) was unconscionable when made.
Even though this illustration is found in section 234, it is
possible to apply section 237(3) to these facts. Did the seller have
reason to believe Mrs. Williams would not manifest assent if she
knew the writing contained the add-on term? Probably yes under
section 237(3) as originally drafted; Mrs. Williams would
therefore not be bound by the term. The author of the modified
version, however, would apparently answer the question in the
negative. 20 8 It is the kind of "bad" term that Mrs. Williams would
203 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 237, illustration 2.
204 Klar v. H. & M. Parcel Room, Inc., 270 App. Div. 538, 61 N.Y.S.2d 285, aff'd, 296
N.Y. 1044, 73 N.E.2d 912 (1947).
203 See, e.g., Murray, supra note 10.
206 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 1, § 234, illustration 5.
207 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
2o8 See text accompanying note 186 supra.
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prefer not to be part of the printed document, but "she would
have to take the good with the bad." The term might then be
excised under the rubric of unconscionability. It is possible to
include as part of the other party's "reason to believe," his
knowledge that he was in a bargaining position so strong as to be
dictatorial. Thus he would have no reason to believe that Mrs.
Williams would not assent to the oppressive term since he knew
that she had no choice. The inseparability of the lack of aware-
ness and the lack of choice, which the Restatement (Second) at-
tempts to separate, is thus confirmed.
D. Determining the "Circle of Assent": Unconscionability
The unconscionability cases decided since the enactment of
the Uniform Commercial Code, and even some pre-Code ef-
forts, almost invariably involve a combination of the two ele-
ments of lack of awareness and lack of choice.20 9 The typical
provision is either illegible or in the kind of print no one reads
or understands. If the term is material and unexpected, a party
should not be bound by it unless it has been brought to his
attention. In the rare cases in which such a term is indeed
brought to the attention of the signer, the question becomes
whether real assent was manifested at that point or whether the
term was forced upon the signer.
The philosophy underlying the Uniform Commercial Code
is that the writing does not necessarily define the true "circle of
assent. '210 One illustration of this is found in section 2-316(1) of
the Code, dealing with the disclaimer of express warranties.
21'
Illustration eight to section 237 of the Restatement (Second) takes
note of U.C.C. section 2-316(1).212 To suggest that a disclaimer
of "any warranties not set forth in the documents" cannot effec-
tively disclaim the critical specification of the goods involved is a
truism: The disclaimer deals with "warranties not set forth in the
documents"; but the express warranty (by description) of the
specification is set forth in the documents. The disclaimer, thus,
by its express terms does not apply.
There is, however, another reason why illustration eight is
unfortunate. Section 2-316(1) of the Code is simply a species of
209 See MURRAY, supra note 1, § 354, and cases cited therein.
210 Murray, supra note 43, at 276.
211 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316(1).
212 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note I, § 237, illustration 8.
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the generic concept of assent. The same basis is found in section
2-719(2) of the Code, which prohibits a limitation or modifica-
tion of Code remedies if the bargain will thus fail of its essential
purpose.213 It is the "agreement in fact" that the Code seeks to
protect in these and other sections: A clause disclaiming all war-
ranties including the warranties describing the very goods which
are the subject matter of the sale destroys the crucial assent of
the parties. Equally absurd is a remedy clause that destroys the
bargain. The parties will not be said to have assented to such
clauses, regardless of the terms of the writing.
It is important to recognize that the two elements, reasona-
ble lack of awareness of oppressive terms and lack of choice as to
such terms, are recognized by the Restatement (Second) both in
section 234 and in section 237. Comment d to section 234 deals
with "[w]eakness in the bargaining process." Listed among the
factors that may contribute to a finding of unconscionability are
"knowledge of the stronger party that the weaker party is unable
reasonably to protect his interests by reason of physical or men-
tal infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy or inability to understand the lan-
guage of the agreement, or similar factors. ' 214 It is here appropriate
to recall the Reporter's response to Professor Farnsworth
21 5
where he referred, in discussing section 237, to "the stronger
party who submits the adhesion contract." The Restatement
(Second), in elaborating the test for "reason to believe" that the
signer is unaware of the oppressive or bizarre term, further evi-
dences the commingling of section 234 and 237 concepts: "The
inference is reinforced if the adhering party never had an oppor-
tunity to read the term, or if it is illegible or otherwise hidden
from view. This rule is closely related to the policy against un-
conscionable terms .... ,26 The last remark is hardly necessary.
In addition to reconfirming the overlap between the two
sections, the comments to section 234 are important in recogniz-
ing that the assent of the weaker party will be viewed under all
the surrounding circumstances. Evidence of his general compe-
tency, as well as specific evidence of any physical or mental in-
firmities, ignorance, illiteracy, and the like, will be relevant. The
"weakness" of the adhering party will be determined through
213 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-719(2).
214 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), supra note 1, § 234, comment d (emphasis supplied).
215 Text accompanying note 184 supra.
216 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 237, commentf (emphasis supplied).
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empirical verification of the circumstances surrounding the
agreement. What is unconscionable, therefore, in relation to an
unskilled worker with language deficiencies may not be uncon-
scionable in relation to a lawyer. This variable knowledge
standard-what the particular party would have reason to know
and understand-is desirable. It may not be relevant to choice at
all, however, because the lawyer who wishes to purchase an au-
tomobile is forced to sign the same standardized form as the
unskilled laborer; he derives no additional bargaining power
from his knowledge of, say, the presence of warranty disclaimers
in the sales agreement. Nevertheless, the factors contributing to
a finding of unconscionability suggest that it will be more dif-
ficult for the lawyer to benefit from section 234 than for others
with less actual or presumed knowledge.217 Nothing in section
234, unfortunately, addresses this problem; curiously, section
237(2) may be read as providing some answer.
E. Equality of Treatment:'The Irrelevancy of Knowledge
"[A standardized agreement] is interpreted wherever rea-
sonable as treating alike all of those similarly situated, without
regard to their knowledge or understanding of the standard
terms of the writing."2 18 The Reporter regarded this subsection
"as part of the law of nature," though he "found it surprisingly
hard to find somebody who could formulate it."'21 9 It stands for
the proposition that
when you have a standardized agreement, one of the
things about it is that it's supposed to be standard, and
treat everybody the same way .... [T]he interpretation
is not. . one that's personal to the particular plaintiff
• . .but rather depends on the average member of
the community who is likely to use this kind of
agreement.
220
This is the sole elaboration of section 237(2) to be found in the
Proceedings. The comment is equally frugal: "[C]ourts in con-
struing and applying a standardized contract seek to effectuate
the reasonable expectations of the average member of the public
who accepts it. The result may be to give the advantage of a
217 See id. § 234, comment d.
218 Id. § 237(2).
219 47 ALI PROCEEDINGS 524 (1970).
220Id. 524-25.
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restrictive reading to some sophisticated customers who con-
tracted with knowledge of an ambiguity or dispute."
221
The sole illustration following the comment to section
237(2) involves an exclusionary clause in an accident insurance
policy and concludes that the insured is covered by the policy
"without regard to his knowledge or understanding of the
quoted language at the time of contracting. 2 22 The illustration is
based on Kievit v. Loyal Protective Life Insurance Co.,223 and the
critical language from that opinion is worthy of note:
[T]he court's goal in construing an accident insurance
policy is to effectuate the reasonable expectations of the
average member of the public who buys it; he may
hardly be expected to draw any subtle or legalistic dis-
tinctions based on the presence or absence of the ex-
clusionary clause for he pays premiums in the strong
belief that if he sustains accidental injury which results
in his disability he will be indemnified .... 224
Had plaintiff been an attorney intimately acquainted with such
clauses rather than a forty-eight-year-old carpenter, would the
court still have regarded his actual knowledge as irrelevant and
treated him identically with plaintiff Kievit? Granted, the subsec-
tion contains the qualifying phrase "wherever reasonable," pro-
viding a court with an escape hatch in such a situation;
22 5
nevertheless, the last sentence of section 237's comment e sug-
gests that a "sophisticated customer" may be given an advantage
in such a situation because the subsection directs a court to dis-
regard special knowledge.226 Consequently, we are left with the
question why a court should disregard special knowledge on the
part of a particular "sophisticated customer." Why, after all,
should a court refrain from considering this important circum-
stance under section 237 but not under section 234?
There is a basis for disregarding the special knowledge of a
sophisticated customer-namely, that his special knowledge, his
total awareness of the standard form that he signed, did not
provide him any more bargaining power than that possessed by
221 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 237, comment e.
222 Id. § 237, illustration 4.
223 34 N.J. 475, 170 A.2d 22 (1961).
224 Id. at 488-89, 170 A.2d at 30 (1961).
22' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 1, § 237(2).
221 Id. § 237, comment e.
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a party without such knowledge. The lawyer who under gun-
point signs a writing allegedly evidencing a contract, is well
aware of the terms of the writing, but he signs anyway. Section
234 should emphatically recognize this fact; indeed, both sec-
tions should realistically consider the special circumstances af-
fecting each signer. It is unfortunate to pretend that the signer is
unaware of particular provisions in a form. It is equally unfortu-
nate to ignore the fact that even with total understanding of the
terms he may lack any bargaining power with respect to them.
The confusion and misdirection caused by section 237(2), par-
ticularly in its placement in section 237 rather than in section
234, is simply another manifestation of the general problem of
the two sections: the failure to distinguish between the lack of
assent due to reasonable lack of awareness and the lack of assent
due to the lack of any reasonable choice.
IV. CONCLUSION
The pervasive deficiency in the Restatement (Second) formula-
tion of the parol evidence process and in its examination of
standardized writings is the failure to perceive the essence of
assent. The initial failure to distinguish between the agreement
and the writing is a clear manifestation of the underlying con-
ceptual error strewn throughout the parol evidence sections. A
useful restatement of the parol evidence process must concen-
trate on the integration process and must ask the fundamental
question: Did the parties intend their assent to be manifested
finally, or completely and finally, by the writing evidencing their
assent? This question recognizes that, though the writing may be
coextensive with the agreement, it is not itself the agreement but
only evidence thereof.
Similarly, a discussion of standardized agreements should
recognize that the printed form itself is suspect: It may not be
coextensive with the true intention of the parties. In such a case,
the true intent will prevail and the printed form will be disre-
garded to the extent it contains terms that reasonable parties
would not expect; and terms that the parties would not expect to
be omitted from such a standard form will be included in the
agreement if omitted from the writing. Finally, even if the form
is read and the terms are totally comprehensible to the signer, he
will not be bound if he had no choice as to any oppressive,
material risk-shifting term. These thoughts can be gleaned-but
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only gleaned, and that only with considerable effort-from the
Restatement (Second).
Other aspects of topic three of chapter nine of the Restate-
ment (Second)-interpretation of integrated agreements,227 situa-
tions in which the parol evidence rule does not apply,228 inte-
grated agreements subject to oral conditions, 229 and untrue
recitals and evidence of consideration 23 0-have been briefly ex-
plored elsewhere and, in any case, do not raise problems of the
same magnitude as those raised by the discussion of the parol
evidence process and standardized agreements. When the
draftsmen of the Restatement (Second) initially directed their atten-
tion to the parol evidence process, a number of fine analyses
were available, so that a better result might have been had.
Perhaps my criticisms expect more of a restatement than it can
reasonably deliver, given the spirit of compromise which must
pervade the process. Unfortunately, however, judicial reliance
on these newly stated provisions may result in absurd decisions
or may lead to the conclusion that the new provisions are simply
unusable. If so, then the Restatement (Second) of Contracts will have
failed to provide the cohesive guidance it should, and much of
its purpose will remain unfulfilled.
227 Id. § 238.
228 Id. § 240,
229 Id. § 243.
23Id. § 244.
